DFCU Bank’s conduct in the ongoing Shs. 1.5 trillion Crane Bank legal battle has come under harsh scrutiny in the UK High Court, where Deputy Judge Paul Stanley KC rebuked the Ugandan lender for attempting to improperly weave disputed conclusions into its defence using a questionable forensic report commissioned during the controversial acquisition of Crane Bank.
In a damning procedural judgment delivered on July 24, the London Commercial Court refused DFCU permission to smuggle into the trial broad allegations derived from PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) forensic reports, which DFCU attempted to present as factual evidence, even though they were never independently verified and were not available at the time key decisions were made.
Judge Stanley firmly rejected DFCU’s attempt to incorporate “swathes” of PwC’s conclusions into its pleadings, calling it “obscuring the real issues” and “inconsistent with effective preparation for a fair trial.” He said DFCU’s approach risked creating a “dangerous ambiguity” and would “obstruct the orderly resolution of the case.”
“If the intention were to use these paragraphs as a way of incorporating, by reference, PwC’s conclusions as allegations in this case, this is not the right way of doing so,” the judge ruled. “It would obstruct the orderly resolution of the case.”
DFCU’s strategy appeared designed to backdoor into the trial highly prejudicial claims from the PwC reports—claims that Crane Bank’s management engaged in misrepresentation, fraudulent loans, insider deals, and other irregularities—without having to formally prove those claims at trial. The Court, however, saw through this manoeuvre.
Attempt to Confuse Fact and Allegation
The judgment notes that DFCU repeatedly blurred the line between referencing a report for its existence and using it to establish facts. In some parts of its proposed pleadings, DFCU framed PwC’s statements as objective truths rather than disputed opinions. The judge noted this tactic introduced “dangerous ambiguity” and could mislead both the claimants and the Court.
For example, DFCU’s defence included language suggesting that PwC had uncovered what “in reality” was fraudulent conduct—terminology Judge Stanley found inappropriate for pleadings unless the defendant was prepared to formally adopt those allegations and prove them. DFCU did not.
Improper Insertion of Evidence
Stanley condemned the manner in which DFCU attempted to insert lengthy forensic reports, not as evidence for later trial stages, but as if they were properly pleaded facts. This move violated established legal principles of pleading.
“They effectively incorporate, sometimes explicitly by referring to paragraphs, sometimes indirectly…many paragraphs and pages of the PWC reports,” he observed. “The PwC reports, whatever their merits (which are hotly disputed) do not resemble a pleading.”
DFCU’s approach, the court warned, would have forced Crane Bank’s lawyers to wade through hundreds of unverified forensic allegations and respond to each as if it were a factual claim in the case—a tactic seen as both burdensome and unfair.
Risk of Derailing Trial with Distraction
The court expressed concern that DFCU’s strategy would not only complicate the legal process, but potentially derail the trial itself. Judge Stanley noted the risk of trial disruption, saying the disputed paragraphs introduced “tens of interlinked factual contentions” that could spawn a mini-trial within the trial—something wholly unacceptable in a tightly scheduled 12-week hearing.
He further warned that these elaborate claims, lifted wholesale from PwC’s 150-page reports, would likely require significant additional disclosure, expert rebuttal, and extensive cross-examination—none of which had been properly prepared or pleaded.
“Their pursuit as claims would itself require precise and detailed pleading, and be likely to produce a long and complex trial in its own right,” Stanley wrote.
Failure to Acknowledge Chronological Gaps
The court also found that DFCU attempted to cite PwC’s conclusions as justification for decisions taken by the Bank of Uganda before the reports even existed. This chronological manipulation was called out as misleading, since the PwC reports were commissioned after Crane Bank had been placed under statutory management.
No Clean Hands?
Though not the central issue in this procedural ruling, the judgment indirectly casts doubt on DFCU’s transparency and credibility. Its reliance on contested third-party documents, coupled with an attempt to weaponize them without proper scrutiny, paints a picture of a bank attempting to justify a controversial takeover by flooding the record with unproven accusations.
Conclusion
While the trial on the substantive claims—namely, whether Crane Bank was illegally sold off at a “gross undervalue” as part of a corrupt scheme—has yet to begin, this ruling deals a heavy blow to DFCU’s credibility and tactics. The UK High Court has now made it clear: facts must be proved, not smuggled in under the guise of third-party opinion.
As the case proceeds, the spotlight will remain on whether DFCU and its legal team continue down the path of procedural misdirection—or confront the allegations with actual evidence.
